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NOT so many years ago goods were sold after price higgling in
the market and the final result depended on the relative trading
skill and cupidity of both buyer and seller. In such an economy
uniformity of price and quality of goods were unknown. With
the growth of industry and nationwide retail as well as whole-
sale distributing facilities this simple process has been displaced
by what may be conveniently described as the one-price policy in
which the seller publicly announces his sales policy and the price
at which his goods will be sold. This is now practically the
rule in American industry. But it is a rule with many exceptions.
The exceptions are the price cutters, and it may be safely as-
sumed that they exist in every industry. They have many of
the characteristics of the old selling and marketing methods.
They ply their trade by making special prices to customers by
any one of a variety of methods. The process is cumulative
and if one starts others follow and soon a price structure, built
up by years of hard work, represented by published price lists,
and established business policies, is reduced in practice to chaos
and confusion and as a result there is not even a decent profit for
any one.
Conditions such as these are necessarily accentuated in times
of depression when overproduction meets with diminishing de-
mand and inventories are liquidated, in many cases from com-
pelling reasons, regardless of cost. It is then that competing
sellers struggle to secure their share, or more, of the going
business, and conditions turn from bad to worse.
The purpose of this inquiry is to consider whether the law
offers any help or hindrance in the attainment of at least reason-
able stability of price. The one-price policy must be accepted
as a sound business policy, but certain complicating factors in
modern marketing have raised questions as to the incidence of
the law on traditional marketing policies as they are adapted to
these conditions. Then too, there are questions raised by the
efforts of a given industry, organized as a trade association, to
induce its members to adhere to their publicly announced prices
and policies.
* A. B. University of California, 1923, LL.B. Harvard, 1926, Ph.D. Brook-
ings Graduate School, 1929; author of Lord Hale and Business Affected





This leads to a consideration of Section 2 of the Clayton Act.
That section provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in [interstate] commerce to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers... where the effect of such discrimi-
nation may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of [interstate] commerce:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimi-
nation in price between purchasers of commodities on account
of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity
sold, or that makes only due allowance for difference in the cost
of selling or transportation, or discrimination in price in the
same or different communities made in good faith to meet com-
petition: And provided further, That nothing herein contained
shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or mer-
chandise in [interstate] commerce from selecting their own cus-
tomers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade." I
Section 2 of the Clayton Act was designed primarily to outlaw
the practices of large corporations of local price-cutting for the
purpose of destroying a local competitor. The report of the
Judiciary Committee of the House is explicit on this point. The
report goes on to say that:
"We are not dealing with an imaginary evil or against ancient
practices long since abandoned, but are attempting to deal with
a real, existing, widespread, unfair and unjust trade practice." 2
It is of interest to note that since the passage of the Clayton
Act in 1914, there has been a dearth of instances in which Sec-
tion 2 has been used to deal with this practice.3 Whether the
reason for this is to be found in the deterrent effect of the e.ist-
ence of the statute, or in the development of more tolerant com-
petitive methods, does not concern us. The fact of present signi-
ficance is that, in the contest for mastery between the one-price
system and higgling in the market, Section 2 is being used as a
weapon on the side of the one-price system.
Beginning about 1919, the Federal Trade Commission inau-
gurated the practice of sponsoring Trade Practice Conferences
at which representatives of a given industry met in conference
138 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1926).
2R EPORT OF HOUSE COMMITITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 63d Cong., 2d. Sess.,
Misc. H. R. Rep., v. 2, no. 627, May 6, 1914, at 8.
3 Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.
(2d) 234 (C. C. JA. 2d, 1929), certiorari denied, 279 U. S. 858, 49 Sup.
Ct. 353 (1929), is the outstanding instance. See also Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Galena Signal Oil Co., 2 F. T. C. 446 (1920), and Federal
Trade Commission v. Fleischmann Co., 1 F. T. C. 119 (1918).
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and under the aegis of the Commission, and subject to its ap-
proval, drew up and agreed to be bound by a set of rules de-
signed to eliminate unfair methods of competition in the in-
dustry.4 Since that time such rules or codes of ethics have been
drawn up by about one hundred industries, ranging in size and
importance from the petroleum industry at the top of the scale
to, with all due deference, the baby carriage industry at the
bottom of the scale. In about seventy-five of these codes there
is a rule declaring, in one form or another, that price discrimi-
nation is an unfair method of competition., In many instances
the rule is stated in the exact language of Section 2 of the Clay-
ton Act with the added clause that such discrimination is an
"unfair method of competition." 7 As such, the rule is merely
an injunction to obey the law and is to be interpreted according
to available court decisions.
The statute prohibits price discrimination where the effect
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly "in any line of commerce," but it was not until 1929, in
the case of George Van Camp & Sons Company v. American
Can Company,8 that it was authoritatively declared by the
Shpreme Court that the statute meant just what it said. The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had held in
the earlier cases of Mennen Company v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion 9 and National Biscuit Complany v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion 10 that the statute only applied to such discrimination as
might substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in the line of commerce in which the discriminator was en-
gaged. The court attempted to ascertain the intent of Congress
by reference to reports of congressional committees and other
extraneous aids to statutory construction and concluded that
4 On June 5, 1926, the Federal Trade Commission issued an order creat-
ing a Division of Trade Practice Conferences to meet the growing demand
of industries for conferences. This order is reported in 2 FEDERAL TuADe,
REGULATION SERVICE (1930-1932) par. 2501, published by Commerce Clear-
ing House, Inc.
5 The rules approved by the Federal Trade Commission are reported in
2 FEDERAL TRADE REGULATION SERVICE (1930-1932) 3355 ot seq.
6 No useful purpose would be served by a complete catalogue of the
industries that have adopted a price discrimination rule and of the many
and various forms that this rule takes. The curious reader will find tho
rules collected and indexed in Federal Trade Regulation Service, supra
note 5.
7 A typical example is Rule 4 of the rules for the Plumbing & Heating
Industry, approved September 23, 1929, and revised October 16, 1931, as
reported in 2 FEDERAL TRADE REGULATION SERVICE (1930-1932) par. 2568.
8 278 U. S. 245, 49 Sup. Ct. 112 (1929).
9 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), certiorari denied, 262 U. S. 759, 43
Sup. Ct. 705 (1923).
10 299 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924), certiorari denied, 266 U. S. 613, 45
Sup. Ct. 95 (1924).
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they pointed to this. result. 1 The Supreme Court, however,
found that the words "in any line of commerce" were clear and
unambiguous. As the court said, "There is nothing to con-
strue." 1 The Supreme Court rejected the reports of congres-
"sional committees and other aids to statutory construction on
the ground that such extraneous aids could only be used in cases
of ambiguity, and it found none.
The decision in the Van Camp case has given new life to Sec-
tion 2 of the Clayton Act. The merchandising policies and prac-
tices of a producer engaged in interstate commerce must now
be considered not only from the point of view of their effect on
competitors of the producer but also from the point of view of
their effect on retailers and wholesalers and others in the broad
competitive field in which his goods move.
But the litigation of the Van Canip case was merely a pre-
liminary skirmish in the effort of certain packing companies to
recover treble damages from the American Can Company based
on an alleged price discrimination. 3 That case removed the
obstacle presented by the Mennen and National Biscuit cases and
soon after that decision the first suit, in which the Ladoga Can-
" Judge Rogers quoted from the REPORT OF THE JUDICIARY COMIMITTEE OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 2, to the effect that the evil
aimed at was the practice of large corporations of local price cutting to
destroy a local competitor. However, this report was rendered on May
6, 1914, 51 Cong. Rec. 8201, and at that time Section 2 did not contain
the phrase "in any line of commerce." The bill before the House pro-
hibited price discrimination "with the purpose or intent to thereby destroy
or wrongfully injure the business of a cornpctitor of eithcr mich pzrcliascr
or seller." (italics ours.) Judge Rogers did not quote the full text of the
House Report. He omitted the following sentence: "This section expressly
forbids discrimination in price.., when such discrimination is made with
the purpose or intent to thereby destroy or wrongfully injure the business
of a competitor either of such dealer or seller." Supra note 2. The elimina-
tion of this phraseology would seem to disqualify the House Report as an
aid to determining intent of Congress in adopting the substitute phrase
"in any line of commerce." Further, the phrase finally adopted is con-
sistent with the discarded phrase and, if anything, is broader in scope.
The argument outlined above is fully developed in the reply brief of
appellant, George Van Camp & Sons Company, in the Van Camp case,
supra, note 8.
In HENnERsoN, THE FEDERAI TRADE COMMISSION (1924) at 276, the
author suggests that the original phraseology "of a competitor of either
such purchaser or seller" was ungrammatical because there was no ante-
cedent to the word "such." He adds that the change may have been made
to make the statute grammatical and he finds no reason to suppose that
there was any intention to limit its scope.
12 Supra. note 8, at 253, 49 Sup. Ct. at 113.
13 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 15
(1926), provides that "any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" may
sue therefor and shall recover threefold the damages sustained by him
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
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ning Company was plaintiff, came to trial. The result was a
verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $30,000. Judgment was
entered for $105,000, being treble the amount of the verdict
together with plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount
of $15,000. Both sides appealed from the judgment to the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, but we are concerned only with defend-
ant's assignments of error.14 The evidence showed that defendant
American Can Company was the largest manufacturer in the
United States of tin cans used as containers by packers of
canned goods and that plaintiff Ladoga Canning Company was
a relatively small concern engaged in canning food stuffs and
selling its products in competition with hundreds of other can-
ners. One of the largest competitors of plaintiff was the Van
Camp Packing Company. Plaintiff charged that American Can
Company discriminated in price in favor of Van Camp; that
this favorable price for cans gave Van Camp a great competitive
advantage over plaintiff; that the effect of this discrimination
was to substantially lessen competition in the line of commerce in
which plaintiff and Van Camp were engaged and tended to
create a monopoly in Van Camp in certain lines of commerce;
and that plaintiff had suffered damage. American Can Com-
pany admitted that it made a more favorable price to Van Camp
than to plaintiff. It attempted to bring the discrimination within
the provisos of Section 2 on the ground that Van Camp pur-
chased in greater volume than plaintiff, that unless given the
special price Van Camp would go into the can business and that
the price was made to meet a price made by a competitor of
American Can. The court held that there was ample evidence
to justify the jury in finding that the allowances and rebates
granted to Van Camp and denied to plaintiff and others
amounted to as much as eighteen per cent of the price paid by
Van Camp and that this special price was a material factor in
the sale of the finished product. It was proved that the cost of a
tin can amounted to nearly one-third of the entire cost of a
can of food and in some instances equalled or exceeded the cost
of the food. The court also held that since Ladoga had made
a prima facie case of discrimination the burden of proof was on
American Can Company to establish its justification and that
the jury was justified in rejecting the evidence offered by
American Can on this issue. It appeared that American Can
advertised widely that all its cans of like character and size were
sold at the same price to all customers and that all prices were
f. o. b. Indianapolis. On a certain day, however, American Can
made two contracts with Van Camp, one binding and the other
not, the one not binding naming the published price made to all
14 Ladoga Can Co. v. American Can Co., 44 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 'th,
1930), certiorari denied, 282 U. S. 899, 51 Sup. Ct. 183 (1931).
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of Van Camp's competitors and the one binding containing the
agreements for special allowances and rebates. The latter was
guarded with the utmost secrecy.
In disposing of American Can Company's contention that the
discrimination was based on Van Camp's volume of purchases
and that therefore, as a matter of law, the evidence should not
have been submitted to the jury, the court used this significant
language:
"That defendant's price discrimination was due to its desire
to retain Van Camp's business may be conceded. Such an object
was perfectly justifiable, but under the statute it could not be
attained through price discriminations save as the volume of
the latter's business justified it, or unless the discounts were
granted to meet competition. Setting to one side the last named
justification for the discrimination, as we must, in view of the
jury's rejection of it, defendant's course, if approved, must find
support solely in the volume of Van Camp's business. But if the
volume of Van Camp's business was the basis of reduced prices,
should not such prices have been available to all customers who
bought cans of like amount? Were not all canners entitled to
know the amount of purchases necessary to obtain the saving in
cost of cans? Without such information Van Camp's competitors
were not in the same position to plan for future business, and
it was this concealment of fact coupled with defendant's assur-
ance that no price reductions were made because of the size or
volume of business that cast discredit on defendant's after-the-
act protestation that the discriminations were made because of
volume of business." '1
The court held that the evidence of American Can's public
statements that all customers were treated alike, coupled with
the secrecy surrounding the special deal with Van Camp, justi-
fied the jury in finding that the discrimination was 9zot based
on quantity. It would seem clear, however, that a manufacturer
who would avoid a charge of price discrimination and the weigh-
ing of his conduct by a jury, cannot safely make a special price
to a favored customer, even though in good faith based on
quantity, unless he offers the same opportunity to all other cus-
tomers. So in this case if American Can had announced that
customers who purchased over a million cans a year would be
entitled to receive a certain discount and then had -granted an
additional discount to some favored purchaser in that class,
there would be a discrimination and Ladoga would have a cause
of action even though the volume of its purchases would never
qualify it for the quantity discount. In other words, Ladoga




nated against. It would be enough to show that there was a
discrimination within the meaning of the statute which had
injured its business.
Of course, Ladoga would have to satisfy the other require-
ments of the statute and, among other things, show that the
favored customer gained a definite competitive advantage and
that the effect might be to substantially lessen competition, and
so on, and prove its damages. In the principal case, Ladoga
offered evidence to show that for five years prior to the making
of the special price the business of Van Camp remained almost
at a standstill and five years afterwards had increased 300 per
cent. This rate of increase was found to be much greater than
that of the canned goods business of the country during the
same period. The court held that from this evidence the jury
might have properly found that the effect of the price discrimi-
nation was to substantially lessen competition or tend to create'
a monopoly in the line of commerce in which Ladoga and Van
Camp were engaged. It is important to note that American Can
made the discriminatory price on tin cans and as far as Van
Camp was concerned this was simply one item in the cost of
production of a can of food. We have seen, however, that it was
a substantial item and in some instances equalled the cost of
the food that went into the cans. If, contrary to the fact, it had
appeared that the cost of a can was an insignificant item in the
cost of the finished product, the court might well have held, as a
matter of law, that the effect of the discrimination could not
give the recipient of the favored price such a competitive ad-
vantage as would tend to "substantially" lessen competition in
that line of commerce. Therefore, such evidence could not prop-
erly go to the jury. In the present case the cost of cans was
approximately one-third of the cost of the finished product. As
to what point must be reached below that figure to justify the
court in holding as above is of course a question of degree to be
answered by the exercise of judgment.
It remains to consider the question of damages. American Can
insisted that Ladoga's evidence failed to show that it had suf-
fered any damage and if any damage was shown it was so
speculative, remote, uncertain and unascertainable as to afford
no basis for a determination by a court or jury. The court re-
jected both contentions. It appeared that immediately following
the execution of the favorable contract, and because of it, Van
Camp commenced price cutting. As a result Ladoga, which for
five years previously had been operating at a profit, was com-
pelled to operate at a loss. In order to negative the suggestion
that Ladoga's losses were due to its own inefficiency or careless-
ness, Ladoga was permitted to show that other canners similarly




"The case is one for the application of the rule which denies
defendant's right to take refuge behind the alleged uncertainty
or indefiniteness of the plaintiff's proof of damages which was
occasioned by defendant's own wrongdoing and its concealment
of such fact from the injured party." 11
Ladoga showed the usual rate of profit under normal opera-
tions and the profit which various canners were able to make
prior to Van Camp's price cutting. This, supplemented by proof
that Van Camp's price cutting was made possible by the dis-
criminatory price and proof of Ladoga's losses, afforded a suffi-
cient basis for an inference as to the effect of the price cutting
on plaintiff's business.
Any uncertainty that might exist as to the validity of this
rule of damages has been removed by the Supreme Court in the
recent case of Story Parchmnent Comipa.ny v. The Pattcrsan
Parchment Paper Company,1. involving a suit for treble damages
based on an alleged conspiracy to destroy plaintiff's business in
violation of the Sherman Act. It is now clear that the courts
will not hold a plaintiff to strict proof of his damages in cases of
this sort. If plaintiff can show a causal connection between the
wrong and the damage, that is, if plaintiff can show what the
Supreme Court described as "the fact of damage," then plain-
tiff will be required only to do the best he can under the cir-
cumstances to show the extent of the damage. He will not be
denied relief if his proof is based on circumstantial evidence
and depends on inferences.
To return to our original question, this decision illustrates
clearly the type of proof necessary to show a violation of Section
2. It is evident that sporadic and trivial discriminations can
scarcely produce that substantial lessening of competition which
is necessary to show a violation of law. It is also evident that
large corporations, more than small ones, will have to take to
heart the lesson learned by the American Can Company because
a departure from its published prices by a large corporation is
fraught with a greater possibility of producing the effect on
competition condemned by the statute than a similar departure
16 Ibid. 769.
1 282 U. S. 555, 51 Sup. Ct. 248 (1931). The Supreme Court reversed
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 37 F. (2d) 537 (C.
C. A. 1st, 1930) ; see Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1035. While the facts
in this ease and the Ladoga case are somewhat different, the statements
of the law in the opinions of the circuit courts in these two cases repre-
sent conflicting points of view. The fact that the opinion of the Supreme
Court in the Story Parchment Co. case is in harmony with the opinion
in the Ladoga case lends added significance to the denial of certiorari by
the Supreme Court in the latter case.
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by a small corporation. The extent to which this decision will
vitalize Section 2 remains to be seen. Its importance should not
be over-emphasized because this section is technical, and is so
hedged around with provisos and traps to catch an over-zealous
plaintiff that it is not to be supposed that the Ladoga case will
at once open a new and inviting field for litigation.
II
Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that both the Van Camp and
Ladoga cases have sharpened the teeth of Section 2 and increased
the importance to producers of adopting merchandizing policies
which will not be susceptible to the charge of discrimination.
In general there are two policies that are commonly followed.
One is to classify the trade into jobbers, wholesalers and re-
tailers, or some similar functional classification, and to allow
to wholesalers or jobbers a greater discount, or lower price,
than is allowed to retailers. The other is to base prices on the
quantity purchased, the greater the quantity the greater the
discount. 8 Under this policy no classification of customers is
made. Quantity, and quantity alone, determines the price. An
attempt will be made to consider some of the questions that are
raised by the two sales policies outlined above. The Me/nnen
and National Biscuit cases illustrate these sales policies and in
spite of the fact that their authority has been substantially
impaired by the decision in the Van Camp case, they must
nevertheless be reckoned with. They also illustrate the prac-
tical business situations that raise the legal questions.
The functional classification would involve no difficulties in
a market in which all possible customers could be readily pigeon-
holed as jobbers, wholesalers or retailers, but in many industries
such is not the fact, or, in some cases, considered the fact, The
rapid growth of chain stores, department stores, mail order
houses and cooperative buying pools has disturbed this tradi-
tional hierarchy. We are not concerned with the questions of
business policy -that are involved in the efforts of the manu-
facturer to please all classes of customers, but we are concerned
with the questions that must be answered if legal complications
are to be avoided.
The sales policy of the Mennen Company in effect in 1921
involved a classification of its trade into wholesalers and re-
tailers and the allowance to wholesalers of a greater discount
than that allowed to retailers. Pursuant to this plan the com-
pany refused to recognize as wholesalers a group of retailers
38 These and other sales policies are discussed in COPELAND, PRINCIPLES
OF MERCHANDISING (1924) C. xi.; CONVERSE, MAIRKETING METHODS AND
POLICIES (1921) c. xxii.
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who had organized on a cooperative basis for the purpose of
pooling their purchases and securing the wholesalers' discount.
In adopting this sales policy the company aligned itself on the
side of the so-called "legitimate" distributors as against the
growing chain stores, department stores, mail order houses and
cooperative buying pools.-0 The Federal Trade Commission at-
tacked this sales policy as an unfair method of competition in
violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, -
and as a price discrimination in violation of Section 2 of the
Clayton Act. It found that in many instances a retailer would
purchase as large a quantity as a wholesaler; that as a result
the Mennen Company was in the position of making a different
price to purchasers of a like quantity; and that this difference
was not justified by any difference in the cost of selling or any
other difference permitted by the provisos. It also found that
the effect of this discrimination might be to substantially lessen
competition, not between the Mennen Company and its competi-
tors, but between the distributors. The Commission issued a
sweeping order requiring the Mennen Company to cease and
desist "from discriminating in net selling prices, by any method
or device, between purchasers of the same grade, quality and
quantity of commodities, upon the basis of a classification of
its customers as 'jobbers', 'wholesalers', or 'retailers', or any
similar classification which relates to the customers' form of
organization, business policy, business methods, or to the busi-
ness of the customeis' membership or shareholders." -1
It is impossible to escape the conclusion that by the issuance
19 The Federal Trade Commission found that at least fifty-three con-
cerns, many of them corporations, cooperative or mutual in form and func-
tioning as distributors at wholesale, were classified as retailers by the
Mennen Co. See Federal Trade Commission v. The Mennen Co., 4 F. T. C.
258 (1922), Findings of Fact, paragraphs 4 (c) and (d) at 277. It was
also found that the growth of these concerns had been very rapid and
that the aggregate gross sales of twelve such corporations in 1920 were
$22,890,282.31 and that the sales so made were to the retail trade at whole-
sale prices. IbWd. par. 11 (f) and (g) at 281. The commission also found
that there was no evidence to show that it cost the company more to sell
the independent retailers than the chain stores. Ibid. par. 17 (b) at 282.
20 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1926). The court, applying
the test laid down in Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421,
40 Sup. Ct. 572 (1920), concluded that the sales policy of the Mennen
Company was not an unfair method of competition. The court said: "So
far as appears, they undertook, acting independently, to sell their law-
fully acquired property in the ordinary course, without deception, mis-
representation, or oppression, and at fair prices, to purchasers willing
to take it upon terms openly announced." Supra note 9, at 777.
21 See Federal Trade Commission v. The Mennen Co., supra note 19, at
283. An identical order was issued by the Commission on a similar set




of this order the Commission was attempting to revolutionize
the sales policies of American business. Had this order been
sustained the so-called trade discount based on a functional
classification of purchasers as wholesalers, jobbers, retailers,
etc., would have had to be abandoned and sales policies would
have had to be framed within the four corners of the provisos
of Section 2. A manufacturer could make a different price to
different purchasers only if based on differences in the "grade,
quality or quantity" sold or in the "cost of selling or transporta-
tion" or if "made in good faith to meet competition." In short,
the manufacturer would be driven to the use of the quantity
discount. Such a result is indeed a far cry from the original
purpose of Section 2.
The Mennen Company petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals
to review the order and secured a rev'ersal of the Commission.
The opinion of the court discloses a failure to analyze and state
clearly the questions presented in their relation to the facts.
The net result is a confusion of language which gives little
comfort to the puzzled lawyer. The holding of the court, how-
ever, is that the sales policy in question was not an unfair
method of competition, and did not involve discrimination and,
even if discriminatory, there was no showing that the dis-
crimination had substantially lessened competition between the
Mennen Company and its competitors, and without such a show-
ing there could be no violation of Section 2.
In holding that this sales policy did not involve a discrimina-
tion the court said:
"What the Mennen Company has done, was to allow to 'whole-
salers' who purchased a fixed quantity of their products a cer-
tain rate of discounts while to the 'retailers' who purchased
the same quantities it denied the discount rates allowed to the
'wholesalers'. This does not indicate any purpose on the part
of the Mennen Company to create or maintain a monopoly. The
Company is engaged in an entirely private business and it has
a right freely to exercise its own independent discretion as to
whether it will sell to 'wholesalers' only or whether it will sell
to both 'wholesalers' and 'retailers', and if it decides to sell to
both it has a right to determine whether or not it will sell to
the 'retailers' on the same terms it sells to the 'wholesalers'. It
may announce in advance the circumstances, that is, the terms,
under which it will sell or refuse to sell." 22
"In accordance with these opinions we have no doubt that
the Mennen Company had the right to refuse to sell to retailers
at all, and if it chose to sell to them that it had the right to
22Supra note 9, at 779.
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fix the price at which it would sell to them, and that it was
under no obligation to sell to them at the same price it sold
to the wholesalers. It did not discriminate as between retailers
but sold to all retailers on one and the same scale of prices. And
it did not discriminate as between wholesalers but sold to all
wholesalers on one and the same scale of prices. There is nothing
unfair in declining to sell to retailers on the same scale of
prices that it sold to wholesalers even though the retailers bought
or sought to buy the same quantity the wholesalers bought." 3
The court seems to have leaned heavily on the right of a
manufacturer to select his own customers. This is expressly
recognized in the last proviso of Section 2.2 But this proviso,
23Supra note 9, at 781.
24 "And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent
persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce
from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in
restraint of trade." 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1926).
The operation of this proviso is well illustrated in Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915).
The Cream of Wheat Co. had a sales policy of selling only to wholesalers
at a fixed discount. It refused to sell to anyone else. The chain store
was anxious to secure Cream of Wheat products at the wholesalers' dis-
count in order to sell at retail at cut prices. On the refusal of the Cream
of Wheat Co. to continue to sell to it it brought suit alleging that this
was a discrimination. The court after observing that "this suit is really
brought to force defendant to continue to sell to this single retailer"
[p. 48] went on to say: "We have not yet reached the stage where the
selection of a trader's customers is made for him by the Government."
Ibid. 49.
l n Cudahy Packing Co. v. Frey & Son, Inc., 261 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 4th,
1919) (see also Federal Trade Commission v. Cudahy Packing Co., 1 F.
T. C. 199 (1918)) the question was presented as to whether or not the
refusal to sell to a jobber because he would not maintain resale prices was
a discrimination. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the resale price
maintenance plan of the Packing Co. was legal and that the refusal to
sell to the price-cutting jobber was simply an exercise of the right to
select customers. The authority of the decision on the latter point is
shaken by the reversal by the Supreme Court of the holding as to the
legality of the resale price maintenance plan, Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 256 U. S. 208, 41 Sup. Ct. 451 (1921). Assuming the legality
of the plan, a manufacturer would seem to be within his rights in refusing
to sell because the customer is a price-cutter. This proposition is not
altogether free from doubt, however, because the right to select customers
is qualified by the words "in bona fide transactions and not in restraint
of trade." While these qualifying words have not as yet been applied
in any ease, they would seem to justify a holding that the systematic and
rigorous exercise of the right of selection by refusing to sell to price-
cutters is competent evidence, along with other evidence, of an unlawful
plan to maintain resale prices. This proviso was involved in the recent
case of Sidney-Morris & Co. v. National Association of Stationers, 40 F.
(2d) 620 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930). The circuit court reversed the district
court which had sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. The com-
plaint charged a particular manufacturer with having discriminated in
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while it would clearly justify a holding that a person might
discriminate in any way he sees fit, or for any reason that
appeals to him, in the selection of customers, would scarcely
extend to a case in which there was a discrimination in price
among the customers selected. To say that a person may select,
is simply to say that a person who is not selected has no cause
to complain and that the government will not compel his selec-
tion. But it is a very different thing to say, as the court said,
that because of this right to select, a person who has been
selected cannot be heard to complain of discrimination because
he need not have been selected. The Commission contended
that there had been discrimination among the customers selected,
and at no point in its opinion does the court squarely meet the
proposition that a like quantity of goods was sold to different
purchasers at different prices. The court simply ignored it.
The court in the Mennen case avoided consideration of the
effect of the sales policy in the line of commerce in which the
wholesalers and retailers were engaged, but since the decision
in the Vn Camp case this inquiry will have to be made by
courts in cases in which a discrimination is found. The question
would then be, whether or not the refusal of the Mennen Com-
pany to grant the wholesalers' discounts to the cooperative buy-
ing pool was a discrimination that would have the effect of
substantially lessening competition "in any line of commerce."
It appeared that the Mennen Company had not discriminated
between its so-called "legitimate" wholesalers or between its
retailers. It may be assumed that wholesalers and retailers are
each engaged in a separate "line of commerce" and therefqre
that there is no competition between them to be affected.
By such an approach the legality of the trade discount might
be sustained without denying the obvious discrimination between
buyers of the same quantity. But this, on a shifting market,
may lend scant comfort to the sales manager who, anxious to
avoid legal complications, is confronted with the following di-
lemma. To grant the wholesalers' discount, or some other special
discount not granted to ordinary retailers, to the chain stores,
department stores or cooperative buying pools is to discriminate
against the small, independent retailer. To refuse the whole-
salers' discount is to discriminate between purchasers of a like
price against plaintiff in violation of Section 2 of the Clayton Act In
refusing to sell to him because he would not maintain alleged fixed resale
prices, and joined as defendants a large number of other manufacturers
and certain wholesalers and retailers on the ground that they had joined
in the conspiracy to cut off plaintiff's supply. The court held that the
action was not one based on a conspiracy but that the defendants who had
joined in the refusal to sell plaintiff made themselves liable for the damages
suffered by plaintiff growing out of the alleged violation of Section 2.
Clearly the complaint charged more than a mere selection of customers.
[Vol. 41
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
quantity, that is, between the wholesalers and the chain stores,
department stores and cooperative buying pools.
The sales manager must deal with the realities of his busi-
ness. His dilemma represents the conflict of interest between
the small independent retailer, on the one hand, and the chain
stores, department stores, mail order houses and cooperative
buying pools on the other hand. If he grants the wholesalers'
discount to the latter class he undermines the competitive
strength of the independent retailer. If he denies it, he pre-
serves the balance of competitive strength in the retail field by
taking from the chain stores, and other large purchasers, an
advantage that they demand by reason of their size and, as
we have noted, puts himself in the position of selling to them
at a higher price than to wholesalers even though they purchase
the same or a greater quantity than the wholesalers.
The sales policy questioned in the case of National Biscuit
Company v. Federal Trade C'omm0sSion was based on a
straight quantity discount. Unlike the policy of the Mennen
Company, the National Biscuit Company favored the chain
stores, department stores and mail order houses as against the
fast disappearing present channels of distribution. In order
to remove the competitive advantage enjoyed by chain stores
under this policy, a group of independent retailers pooled their
orders and demanded a discount based on their combined pur-
chasing power. The National Biscuit Company refused to grant
their request and presumably this decision was dictated by a
desire not to offend the powerful chain stores. The Federal
Trade Commission found that this sales policy was discrimina-
tory and tended to substantially lessen competition and create
a monopoly in the retail distribution of the company's products,
and issued an appropriate order to correct the disadvantage.5
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Commission and,
as in the Mennen case, held that there was no discrimination
and even if there was, Section 2 was violated only if the dis-
crimination substantially lessened competition between the Na-
tional Biscuit Company and its competitors. On this latter point
the court found that this sales policy would have no such effect.
The court said, on the contrary, that the refusal of the National
Biscuit Company to grant the discounts to the buying pool
25 Supra note 10. The proceedings before the Federal Trade Commis-
sion are reported in 7 F. T. C. 206 (1924). See also the companion case
of Federal Trade Commission v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 7 F. T. C. 218
(1924).
26 The order to cease and desist required the company either (1) to
base chain store discounts on the quantity delivered to each branch of
the chain, treating each store as a separate purchaser, or (2) to allow
separate and individual purchasers or owners of stores to pool their pur-
chases for the purpose of computing discounts, 7 F. T. C. 206, 217.
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would presumably tend to drive the dissatisfied customers to
its competitors.
The opinion of the court that there was no discrimination
seems indefensible. A strict adherence to its publicly announced
sales policy would require the National Biscuit Company to grant
the quantity discount to any customer who qualified by the
quantity purchased, whether he was a wholesaler, retailer, chain
store, mail order house or cooperative buying pool. When the
company undertook to differentiate between chain stores and
the independent retailers' cooperative buying pool, it was depart-
ing from its announced policy" and was looking at the character
of the purchaser in determining the discount. The court ignored
this and made the inexplicable statement that:
"Equal opportunity is given to all .... The determining factor
is the quantity consumed; there is no discrimination among
purchasers. All are supplied on equal terms according to the
quantity purchased." 27
Future courts, on a similar state of facts, will have to follow
the Van Camp case and consider whether the' discrimination
has the effect of substantially lessening competition in the chan-
nels of distribution. The Federal Trade Commission in the
instant case found that it did. 28 It found that the chain stores
gained a substantial competitive advantage over the independent
retailers.. This finding, if supported by evidence, is binding on
the courts. 29 The National Biscuit Company might argue that
it was confronted with a dilemma, because to refuse the dis-
count to the cooperative buying pool would result in a dis-
crimination between chain stores and independent retailers,
whereas to grant the discount would result in a discrimination
between the retailers composing the pool and those on the out-
side. This situation further emphasizes the practical impossi-
bility of adopting any sales policy that will be wholly free from
some discrimination. As far as the Clyton Act is concerned,
'however, the complete answer of the National Biscuit Company
27 TSupra note 10, at 739.
28 The Commission found that independent retailers were at a competi-
tive disadvantage with chain stores and that in general the effect of
the refusal of the company to grant the quantity discount to cooperative
1buying pools was to tend to substantially lessen competition in the retail
distribution of the company's products. See Federal Trade Commission
v. National Biscuit Co., 7 F. T. C. 206, Findings of Fact, paragraphs 22,
23, 24 and 26, at 215-216. The Commission also found that it cost no more
-to sell to a specified number of independent retailers than it did to sell
-the same number of stores of a chain system. Ibid. par. 17, at 214.
29 Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568,
.43-Sup.- Ct. 210 (1923); International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commig-
sioh, inf'a note 33.
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would be to adhere rigidly to a quantity discount which is ex-
pressly permitted under Section 2, irrespective of the effect on
competition. A sales policy based on a straight quantity dis-
count is undoubtedly the safest one for a sales manager who
would avoid any complications under the Clayton Act.
It should be noted that of all the various discriminations
expressly permitted by the provisos, the quantity discount is
the only one of practical value in the preparation of a sales
policy. To say that you may discriminate because of differences
in the "grade" or "quality" of the commodity is simply to say
that you may charge more for something that costs more to
produce. The same may be said as to "cost of transportation."
The proviso that differences in the "cost of selling" will justify
discrimination is troublesome in its practical application and
may be difficult of proofY3 Further, the discrimination in these
last two instances must make "only due allowance" for these
differences. These hardly furnish a secure foundation for a
sales policy.
The implications of this conclusion are far reaching. In
adopting a policy of a straight quantity discount the producer
definitely favors those of his customers who purchase in large
quantities, namely, chain stores, department stores, mail order
houses and cooperative buying pools. The independent retailer
who must meet this competition if he is to survive is placed at
a distinct competitive disadvantage. Further, under this policy
the ultimate consumer in the rural districts and small towns
must pay more for his goods than the city dweller. This, of
course, is due to the fact that ordinarily the retailer or whole-
saler in the big city will purchase in greater quantity than in
the small town. This last condition does not exist under a policy
involving the functional classification of customers because under
that policy all wholesalers are sold at one price irrespective of
the quantity purchased.
There is a further complication in the question of transpor-
tation charges.3 In many industries it is customary for a manu-
facturer to sell his products f. o. b. factory and let the buyer
pay the freight bill. In other industries the country is divided
into zones and a delivered price is fixed for each zone. Under
both of these policies different prices are made based on differ-
30 The difficulties in establishing this justification are illustrated in the
failure of the Mennen Co. and the National Biscuit Co. to prove to the
satisfaction of the Federal Trade Commission that it cost more to sell
to independent retailers than to the units of a chain store system. See
notes 19 and 23, supra. Even if it is successfully established that there
is a difference in the cost of selling, by what standard is it to be deter-
mined whether the difference in price makes "only due allowance" for
that difference?
32 See CoPEAND and CoNvmzEE, supra note 18.
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ences in the cost of transportation, and this is expressly per-
mitted in the proviso to Section 2. But in some industries it is
customary to make a uniform price to all buyers regardless of
their location. Under this policy the manufacturer necessarily
fixes some figure that represents an average cost of transpor-
tation and reflects it in his selling price. But suppose a buyer
located near the factory complains that this policy is discrimina-
tory in that in effect he is helping to pay the freight bill of the
more distant buyers and claims that because of his location he
is entitled to a lower price. His contention raises a question of
merchandising policy that must be considered in its bearing on
the legal question of discrimination.
Many other considerations enter into the decision as to
whether in a given situation the one policy or the other is to
be adopted and it is not the purpose of this discussion to review
the economic merits and demerits of each policy. However, since
the decision in the Van Camp case any given sales policy, except
the quantity discount, which is expressly permitted irrespective
of its effect on competition, is subject to judicial inquiry to deter-
mine whether or not it substantially lessens competition in the
competitive field of the wholesalers, retailers, chain stores, de-
partment stores, mail order houses and the like. Neither the
business man nor the lawyer can guess on which side of the
scale any court will cast the weight of its decision. If pro-
ducers are driven to the sanctuary of the quantity discount in
order to escape this judicial control, then Section 2 of the Clayton
Act is indeed a meddlesome bit of legislation operating in a
manner never intended by Congress and to an end unsought by
that body.
As long as Section 2 is on the statute books these questions
may have to be decided, and it remains to consider whether there
is any escape from the difficulties discussed above.
The policy of the statute was expressed by the Supreme Court
in the Van Camp case, as follows:
"The fundamental policy of the legislation is that, in respect of
persons engaged in the same line of interstate commerce, com-
petition is desirable and that whatever substantially lessens it
or tends to create a monopoly in such line of commerce is an
evil." 32
A realistic point of view would recognize that some discrim-
ination is inevitable in any sales policy, and, admitting the dis-
crimination, would emphasize the inquiry as to the effect on
competition. The court would then consider the dilemma that
confronts the sales manager in its bearing on the legal ques-
32Supra note 8, at 254, 49 Sup. Ot. at 114.
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tion as to whether or not the effect of the discrimination may be
to substantially lessen competition. Confronted with this choice
a court might properly ask at the moment whether a classifica-
tion of chain stores, department stores, mail order houses and
cooperative buying pools as wholesalers, if you please, was
reasonable, and had due regard for their functions and for the
maintenance of a reasonable equality of opportunity in the com-
petitive field. This test of reasonableness does not involve the
assumption that all purchasers can be readily pigeonholed as
wholesalers or retailers but it does set up a test which will
permit the court to take a practical view of the situation.
The category of a substantial as against an incidental lessen-
ing of competition is a familiar one 33 and has the advantage
of furnishing a flexible standard in future applications of the
statute to business policies and factual situations that are apt
to be more and more complicated. The probability is that in the
growth of the law of price discrimination this category will be
more in the forefront of judicial opinions."
III
It is difficult to escape the conclusion at this point that Section
2 is a nuisance which may be used by a disgruntled customer
3 Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 14
(1926), briefly summarized, declares that it shall be unlawful to impose
as a condition in connection with the sale of goods, that the purchaser
shall not deal in the goods of a competitor of the seller "where the effect
of such .. . condition . . .may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." In construing these
words the Supreme Court said: "Section 3 condemns sales or agreements
where the effect of such sale or contract of sale 'may' be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create monopoly. It thus deals with con-
sequences to follow the making of the restrictive covenant limiting the
right of the purchaser to deal in the goods of the seller only. But we
do not think that the purpose in using the word 'may' was to prohibit
the mere possibility of the consequences described. It was intended to
prevent such agreements as would under the circumstances disclosed prob-
ably lessen competition or create an actual tendency to monopoly. That
it was not intended to reach every remote lessening of competition is
shown in the requirement that such lessening must be substantial." Stand-
ard Fashion Co. v. Blagrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346, 356, 42 Sup. Ct.
360, 362 (1922).
To the same effect see International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 280 U. S. 291, 50 Sup. Ct. 89 (1930), involving the same ques-
tion under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S.
C. § 18 (1926).
3 The early case of Baran v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 256 Fed.
571 (S. D. N. Y. 1919), recognized the importance of this inquiry. In
that case a dealer in tires alleged that the Goodyear Company discriminated
against dealers by selling tires to automobile manufacturers at a sub-
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to present to a judicial tribunal the substantial conflicts of
interest and questions of merchandising policy considered above,
to be resolved by the court as best it can by the interpretation
of the technical and ill-conceived language of the section. It
must also be apparent that the trade associations and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission in so far as they are attempting to stamp
out price cutting by means of Section 2 have chosen an instru-
ment that is unwieldy and ill-designed for their purpose. The
Commission has done nothing to clarify this situation. It has
simply approved the inclusion of the rule condemning price
discrimination in all its technical aspects in a multitude of codes
of ethics without one word of explanation or of caution as to
the uses to which it may properly be put. Until the Commis-
sion abandons its policy of exercising its jurisdiction by the flat
of its orders, without the explanatory opinion which is such an
important part of the judicial process, there is little to be hoped
for in the way of light on this confusing situation80 If, by the
approval of the price discrimination rule, the Commission in-
tends to align itself on the side of the one-price system, it has
chosen an ineffective and misleading way of doing so.
It would seem that under the authority conferred by Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to prevent unfair
methods of competition in interstate commerce a more practical
weapon could be fashioned. It is true that the Commission met
with rebuffs in the Mennen and National Biscuit Company cases
in its effort to declare that the sales policies of those companies
were unfair methods of competition. 3r But in both of those
cases the sales policies were publicly announced and consistently
adhered to. The secrecy and deception which were found in the
Ladoga case and which ordinarily characterize the price cutter
were lacking. The accepted test of an "unfair method of com-
S
stantially lower price. The court found that there could be no lessening
of competition because the two classes of customers were not in competi-
tion. To the same effect see S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug
Co., 3 F. (2d) 415 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925), in which it was alleged that the
sale of spark plugs to a manufacturer of automobiles at less than cost,
to be compensated by increased prices for replacements, was a violation
of Section 2. The court found no lessening of competition under this
policy.
Z5 In HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE C0iimissioN (1924) 333-337,
the author presents a well considered criticism of the Commission for its
failure to present its findings of fact and conclusions in the form of
judicial opinions. The futility of the present procedure is well illustrated
in Federal Trade Commission v. Wayne Oil Tank & Pump Co., 1 F. T. C.
259 (1918), in which the complaint charged the respondent with a viola-
tion of Section 2 of the Clayton Act and the complaint, findings of fact
and order to cease and desist are substantially in the language of Section
2.
sr See note 20, supra.
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petition", as stated by the Supreme Court in Federal Trade Cow-
mission v. Gratz, stresses these elements of deception and bad
faith. The language of the court is as follows:
"The words 'unfair method of competition' are not defined by
the statute, and their exact meaning is in dispute. It is for the
courts, not the commission, ultimately to determine as matter
of law what they include. They are clearly inapplicable to prac-
tices never heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals be-
cause characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression,
or as against public policy because of their dangerous tendency
unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly. The act was
certainly not intended to fetter free and fair competition as
commonly understood and practiced by honorable opponents in
trade." 37
It is submitted that the available decisions do not preclude
the Commission from ruling, if it so desires, that it is an unfair
method of competition for a trader to publish a price list, or
publicly announce a price, and then make a special price to a
favored customer without at the same time offering that special
price to all other customers similarly situated. In keeping with
the same policy it might also rule that all prices must be pub-
licly announced to the trade, and that it is an unfair method
of competition to make any price that is not so announced. Such
a rule could have no application to an industry in which, due
to the nature of the product sold, this would be impracticable,
and, of course, under the rule each trader would remain free
to fix his own prices and publish new price lists at any time.
It may be that such a policy could not be made effective with-
out legislation. The history of governmental control of business
in this country furnishes one striking example of legislation
of the type here discussed. The early federal railroad legisla-
tion did not go beyond an attempt to stamp out the abuses
connected with rebates and discriminatory rates. The Act to
Regulate Commerce of 1887 prohibited rebates and personal dis-
criminations of every sort, and required railroads to publish
all rates and fares and to post them conspicuously at all sta-
tions, as well as file them with the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. It also prohibited the charging of any rate or fare
unless it was published.38 It was not until the passage of the
37 Supra note 20 at 427, 40 Sup. Ct. at 575.
38 Act to Regulate Commerce, 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 1
et seq. (1926). The Elkins Act, 32 STAT. 847 (1903), 49 U. S. C. §§ 41-43
(1926), was designed to strengthen the provisions of the Act of 1887
relating to the observance of published tariffs. For a discussion of the
history of this legislation and its relation to rebating and discriminatory
rates see RIPLEY, RAmRoADs: RATES AND REGULATION (1912) chapters
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Hepburn Act in 1906, nearly twenty years later, that the Inter-
state Commerce Commission was given limited power to fix
rates.39 By this early legislation Congress attempted to impose
the one-price policy on the railroads of the country. Necessarily
questions of constitutionality would be raised by any similar
legislation applicable to business generally. Perhaps the most
troublesome question would be whether such legislation could
be made applicable to businesses that were not "affected with
a public interest." 40
IV
This whole problem may be regarded as an illustration of a
fundamental error into which both courts and Commission are
gradually falling. Section 2, mainly designed to prevent the
growth of monopoly, has been also turned to the business of
preventing unfair practices. As a result, the Commission must
defend its orders against price discrimination, no matter how
deceitful and unfair, by showing a substantial lessening of com-
petition. Even by shifting to Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act this slippery ground might not be entirely
avoided for the courts have shown a disposition to read into
the Act the purposes of the anti-trust legislation.41 Experience
already begins to indicate that the Commission might operate
more effectively if its two functions were kept more distinctly
separate, the preservation of the plane of competition from the
preservation of competition itself.
xiii, xiv and xv. On this point see New York, New Haven and Hartford
R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361, 391, 26 Sup, Ct.
272, 276 (1906).
3934 STAT. 589 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 15 (1926).
40 In the recent case of O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire In-
surance Co., 282 U. S. 251, 51 Sup. Ct. 130 (1931), the Supreme Court,
by a 5 to 4 decision, upheld a New Jersey Statute prohibiting insurance
companies from allowing a commission to an agent in excess of that al-
lowed to any other agent. The effect of the statute was to prohibit all
discrimination in agent's commissions. This statute, like the early railroad
legislation, applied only to a business theretofore found to be "affected with
a public interest." The opinion in this case is of interest here as showing
the disposition of both the majority and minority of the court to con-
sider the constitutionality of the statute from the point of view of the
relation of the agent's commission to the rate charged the insured, over
which the power of the state is clear. The majority found a direct rela-
tion. The minority found none. This case also illustrates the disposition of
the court to regard such legislation as substantially price-fixing legisla-
tion. The question of the constitutionality of similar legislation applicable
to business generally is not foreclosed by this decision, and grounds for
distinguishing it may be devised, but the attitude of mind of the justices
cannot be disposed of so readily.
41 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643, 51
Sup. Ct. 587 (1931).
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